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National	Populist	Challenges	to	Europe’s	Center	Right:	
Three	Questions	for	Europe	S.M.	Amadae	with	Henri	Aaltonen		In	addressing	the	Euro	area	crisis,	Member	States	have	built	a	“Euro	area	governance”	system	which…has	contributed	to	the	consolidation	of	austerity	policies	across	the	economic	and	monetary	union.		The	significant	strengthening	of	the	executive	capacity	of	European	institutions	in	the	field	of	economic	policy	has	taken	place	in	the	absence	of	any	parallel	development	of	parliamentary	control.1			 Across	Europe,	both	the	mainstream	and	relatively	centrist	political	parties—on	the	left	and	the	right—are	challenged	by	the	global	trend	toward	national	populism.		Here	we	provide	an	analysis	of	this	political	reaction	which	evident	throughout	Europe.			This	reaction	threatens	the	traditional	liberal	order	of	democratic	government,	the	rule	of	law,	and	respect	for	minority	rights.		National	populist	parties	have	seized	on	two	issues,	immigration	and	labor,	in	appealing	to	their	supporters.		Some	voters	link	immigration	to	a	shortage	of	jobs,	lower	wages,	and	unemployment.		Some	view	immigrants	as	free	riding	on	state	welfare	provisions	provided	by	hard	working	taxpayers.		Others	vote	against	unpopular	austerity	policies.		These	policies	tend	to	unequally	burden	those	who	are	either	unemployed,	or	find	themselves	in	lower	socio-economic	groups,	because	public	services	and	benefits	are	cut.			To	the	Left	and	Right	of	the	Centrist	Labour	and	Conservative	Parties:	UK	Brexit		 In	the	United	Kingdom	of	2016,	some	citizens	associated	employment	concerns	with	an	open	border	policy	enabling	Eastern	European	workers	from	Hungary	and	Poland	to	accept	jobs	at	lower	wages	than	British	counterparts.																																																										1	Thomas	Piketty,	draft	“Treaty	for	the	Democratization	of	the	Eurozone	governance,”	available	online:		http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/T-DEM%20-%20Final%20english%20version%209march2017.pdf,	accessed	26	Jan	2019.	
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Additionally,	some	voters’	desire	for	autonomy	from	EU	costs	and	economic	regulations	sustained	a	Euroskeptic	position.		Both	concerns	underlay	the	United	Kingdom’s	so-called	Brexit	vote	in	June	of	2016,	laying	the	groundwork	for	its	invocation	of	Article	50	of	the	Treaty	of	European	Union	March	2017	to	leave	the	EU.		72%	of	the	UK’s	electorate	voted,	with	an	overall	result	of	51.9%	voting	to	leave	the	EU,	and	48.1%	voting	to	stay.2		While	voters	in	England	and	Wales	overall	preferred	to	exit	the	European	Union,	voters	in	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	overall	preferred	to	remain.		Two	years	after	the	referendum,	the	split	in	positions	between	leave	and	stay	has	if	anything	only	been	magnified.		Theresa	May’s	center	right	Tory	party	has	thus	far	been	unable	to	push	through	a	consensual	coalition	platform	to	secure	the	United	Kingdom’s	sovereignty	and	economic	autonomy.		This	is	to	some	extent	because	withdrawal	from	the	EU	is	anti-global	and	does	not	provide	a	vision	for	how	its	Northern	Irish	border	is	to	be	managed.		It	also	does	not	have	a	clear	plan	for	how	to	maintain	trade	relations	with	either	EU	member	states,	or	the	numerous	nations	doing	business	with	EU	member	states.		The	home-bound	focus	of	Brexiteers	is	at	odds	with	the	political	center.			Instead	it	caters	to	extremes	of	populist	nationalism	on	both	the	left	and	right	who	yearn	for	national	sovereignty	in	opposition	to	cosmopolitan	internationalism	and	integration	into	a	supra-national	European	Union.				 Fully	understanding	the	Brexit	vote,	and	its	association	with	populist	nationalism,	benefits	from	standing	back	to	see	economic	and	political	developments	over	the	previous	four	decades.		The	themes	of	political	integration,																																																									2	Harry	Brown,	“Post-Brexit	Britain:		Thinking	about	‘English	Nationalism’	as	a	factor	in	the	EU	Referendum,”	International	Politics	Reviews,	5	(2017),	1-12,	p.	1.	
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economic	inclusion,	and	economic	growth	are	all	prominent	in	analyzing	the	factors	that	led	up	to	David	Cameron’s	holding	the	Brexit	referendum	and	the	ensuing	vote	to	leave	the	EU.		In	the	1980s	Margaret	Thatcher	paved	the	way	to	emphasizing	economic	integration	over	securing	political	support	for	the	EU	through	advocating	the	European	single	market	while	distancing	the	UK	from	the	European	Communities	project.		Increasingly	by	the	late	twentieth	century,	leading	up	to	the	2008	financial	crisis,	economic	policies	promoted	globalization	and	economic	integration	into	the	EU	common	market	system.		However	these	polices	generated	an	unequal	distribution	of	benefits.		The	winners	of	the	UK’s	economic	integration	into	European	and	global	markets	were	the	financial	sector	workers	in	London	and	urban	members	of	the	working	force	whose	jobs	constructed	a	cosmopolitan	world.				 Two	prominent	groups	who	did	not	sit	at	the	cosmopolitan	table	were	middle	and	lower	income	earners,	who	in	the	past	had	been	represented	by	the	Labour	Party,	and	conservative	Tory	landed	elites	dwelling	outside	of	London.		By	2000,	the	political	center	of	the	UK,	which	spanned	Tony	Blaire’s	Labour	Party	and	David	Cameron’s	Conservative	Party,	failed	to	appeal	to	voters	from	the	left	and	the	right	who	instead	joined	the	ranks	the	UK	Independent	Party	(UKIP).		UKIP	existed	from	the	1990s	as	a	small	Euroskeptic	British	nationalist	party,	but	became	the	largest	UK	party	in	the	European	Parliament	in	the	mid	2010s.		Researchers	agree	that	an	alliance	of	disgruntled	blue	collar	voters,	and	traditional	elites	who	did	not	profit	from	the	financial	services	industry,	coalesced	to	deliver	the	Brexit	vote.3		The	
																																																								3	Harry	Brown,	“Post-Brexit	Britain:		Thinking	about	‘English	Nationalism’	as	a	factor	in	the	EU	Referendum,”	International	Politics	Reviews,	5	(2017),	10;	Craig	
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political	center	supported	global	trade	and	economic	integration	into	the	EU.		However	politicians	supporting	trade	liberalization	also	delivered	economic	policies	of	austerity	consistent	with	Margaret	Thatcher’s	claim	“there	is	no	alternative”	to	free	markets	and	globalization;	they	conveyed	a	sense	to	many	constituents	that	they	had	no	say	over	either	EU	regulations	or	even	political	decisions	within	the	UK.		To	voters	spurned	by	the	wealth	generated	in	London	and	who	gained	nothing	from	the	cosmopolitanism	offered	by	Europe,	the	Brexit	vote	appeared	to	be	a	vote	for	reestablishing	British	identity	as	an	independent	sovereign	nation.		London,	which	is	home	to	much	of	the	UK’s	government,	higher	education	and	finance,	seemed	more	allied	with	EU	and	global	interests	than	those	of	the	rest	of	the	UK’s	population	(leaving	aside	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland).		For	traditional	landed	elites,	English	national	identity	was	compelling	while	membership	within	the	EU	seemed	hollow	and	even	opposed	to	national	insterest.4		For	working	class	people,	the	UK	Labour	Party	had	become	centrist,	and	served	professional	middle	class	individuals.5		Additionally,	UKIP	actively	advocated	an	anti-immigration	platform	appealing	to	UK	citizens,	whether	white	English,	or	descendants	of	immigrants,	who	felt	threatened	by	new	immigrants	at	work	or	next	door.		Decades	of	political	policies	within	the	UK	failed	to	achieve	inclusive	economic	growth,	yet	fueled	a	new	Gilded	Age	in	London.		This	pushed	traditionalist	Tory	elites	alongside	working	class	voters	in	England	and	Wales	to	reject	Great	Britain’s	membership	in	the	EU.																																																																																																																																																																							Calhoun,	“Populism,	Nationalism,	and	Brexit,”	In	Brexit:		Sociological	Responses,	ed.	by	William	Outhwaite,	57-68.	4	Craig	Calhoun,	“Populism,	Nationalism,	and	Brexit,”	In	Brexit:		Sociological	
Responses,	ed.	by	William	Outhwaite,	58.	5	Harry	Brown,	“Post-Brexit	Britain:		Thinking	about	‘English	Nationalism’	as	a	factor	in	the	EU	Referendum,”	International	Politics	Reviews,	5	(2017),	10.	
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Ironically,	this	local	dissatisfaction	with	integration	into	a	larger	political	and	economic	community	has	also	challenged	the	overall	unity	of	the	United	Kingdom.		This	is	now	evident	as	both	Scotland	the	Northern	Ireland	mainly	preferred	to	remain	members	of	the	EU.	Center-right	and	its	dilemma	in	Germany.	How	AKK	wants	to	be	different	than	chancellor	Merkel.		 The	main	mission	of	AKK	(	Annegret	Kramp-Karrenbauer)	-	at	it	seems	–	is	to	make	a	clear	and	a	swift	break	from	the	so	called	Merkel	line	“	Wir	schaffen	das”	“	We	are	going	make	this	work”	in	the	refugee	question.6	AKK	line	is	to	help	those	who	really	need	help,	and	for	those	do	not	fill	the	criteria	for	a	refugee	status	in	Germany,	to	send	them	back	more	swiftly	as	at	the	moment	is	the	case.7	AKK’s	quest	might	be	seen	as	a	means	to	define	a	sovereign	profile	for	her	or	her	aim	is	to	accommodate	the	lingering	strong	conservative	view	of	politics	in	her	party	CDU	(Christlich	Demokratische	Union	Deutschlands).	AKK	has	already	renounced	that	her	consent	on	abortion	is	not	as	clearly	defined	as	was	the	case	of	Merkel.	AKK	has	brought	to	the	public	knowledge	her	strong	commitment	to	the	Catholic	belief.8		
																																																								6	https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/cdu-startet-werkstattgespraech-zur-fluechtlingspolitik-16034769.html	retrieved	12.2.	2019	and	https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/cdu-fluechtlingspolitik-103.html		7	https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/cdu-startet-werkstattgespraech-zur-fluechtlingspolitik-16034769.html	retrieved	12.2.	2019	8	https://daserste.ndr.de/annewill/archiv/CDU-mit-neuer-Chefin-reicht-fuer-einen-Neustart,erste11426.html	Retrieved	12.2.	2019	and	https://www.domradio.de/themen/kirche-und-politik/2018-11-25/kramp-karrenbauer-ueber-ihren-katholischen-glauben	Retrieved			12.2.	2019	
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	 All	these	statements	and	actions	are	a	sign	for	the	fact,	which	CDU	is	trying	to	make	a	relaunch	into	AKK	regime	of	more	conservative	politics	especially	on	the	refugee	question.	This	due	the	fact,	which	has	been	a	hotly	debated	question	in	Germany	as	well	in	the	CDU.9	In	the	heart	of	this	debate	is	the	fact,	that	voters	have	the	feeling,	that	they	are	worse	of	now,	than	in	the	past.	The	voters	have	the	feeling,	that	they	are	not	included	to	the	society.	The	problem	which	follows	is,	that	the	concept	of	European	integration	and	globalization	are	been	mixed.	The	deeper	integration	is	perceived	as	same	kind	of	problem	as	some	vocal	actors	have	denounced	globalization	to	the	root	problem	in	societies	around	the	globe.10			 One	might	note,	that	surge	for	more	conservatism	in	the	CDU	is	due	the	fact	of	AfD	(Alternative	für	Deutschland)	and	their	outspoken	and	loud	cries	for	more	national	politics	and	value	of	the	German	culture	and	nation.	CDU	has	had	a	long	tradition	with	her	Bavarian	sibling	party	CSU	(Christlich	Sozialistische	Union	Deutschlands),	that	there	cannot	be	a	party	to	their	right.	This	has	over	the	years	meant,	that	both	CDU	as	well	CSU	have	had	a	conservative	strain	in	their	party	structures.	CDU/CSU	needed	to	have	a	platform	for	the	more	conservative	voters	and	this	strategy	functioned	well	until	the	AfD	became	what	it	is	today;	a	blatant	nationalist	party.	After	the	AfD	was	taken	over	by	far	right	wing	actors,	it	was	imminent,	that	the	parties	CDU/CSU	needed	to	act	or	they	felt	compelled	to	do	so,																																																									9	https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/cdu-startet-werkstattgespraech-zur-fluechtlingspolitik-16034769.html			and	https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/werkstattgespraech-der-cdu-einreiseregister-gefordert-16032287.html	Retrieved	12.2.	2019	10https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/.../EZ_eupinions_04_2017_eng... Retrieved	12.2.2019 
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due	to	the	perception	of	vox	populi.	This	meant	to	take	a	more	firm	stand	on	migration,	refugees	and	to	the	EU.	CDU/CSU	wanted	to	constrain	their	space	to	maneuver	from	the	AfD.		This	shows	their	base,	that	they	are	still	open	for	all	kind	of	discussions	about	nationalism,	EU,	migration,	refugees	and	the	Euro.	Only	time	will	show,	whether	this	has	worked	or	not,	and	if	the	so	called	old	parties	offer	anything	that	will	keep	their	voters	loyal	to	their	political	program.			 Interestingly	today	(12.2.	2019),	the	founder	of	AfD,	Bernd	Lucke,	has	denounced	his	former	party	and	made	clear,	that	he	would	like	to	see	the	AfD	without	any	right-wing	nationalists	in	his	former	party.11	AfD	was	formed	in	2013	as	a	protest	party	for	more	comprehensive	discussion	over	the	Euro-crisis	and	its	management	by	politics.12		The	emphasis	then	was	for	more	rational	management	of	the	€-crisis	and	for	opposing	the	bail-out	guarantees	for	Greece.	Macron’s	France	Sidesteps	the	Traditional	Left	and	Right		 In	France,	Emmanuel	Macron,	aware	of	the	deadlock	power	struggle	between	the	center	left	and	right	political	parties	which	provided	an	opening	for	national	populist	Marine	Le	Pen	leading	the	Front	National	party,	came	into	office	with	his	“progressive	centrist”	campaign	in	2017.		Yet	in	enacting	what	some	refer	to	as	neoliberal	austerity	policies,	by	late-2018	his	presidency	was	mired	in	corrosive	actions	of	the	unaffiliated	Yellow	Vests	protesters.	These	activists	were	discomfited	by	Macron’s	gas	tax,	retrenchment	of	social	programs,	and	general	lack	of	support																																																									11	https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/lucke-brief-an-fruehere-partei-brechen-sie-mit-den-rechtsextremisten-in-der-afd-16036861.html	Retrieved	12.2.	2019	12	http://www.spiegel.de/thema/alternative_fuer_deutschland/		Retrieved	12.2.	2019	
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for	laborers’	concerns.		Macron’s	reformist	zeal	came	from	his	appraisal	that	the	economic	policies	of	the	1970s,	which	built	a	sturdy	social	welfare	state	on	a	solid	base	of	manufacturing	industry,	could	no	longer	be	sustained—especially	given	the	global	impact	of	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis.		From	sweeping	tax	reforms	favoring	wealthier	citizens,	to	reducing	the	power	of	unions	and	favoring	a	more	precarious	work	force,	Macron	appears	to	be	a	neoliberal	leader	who	appeals	to	conservative	financial	interests.		Commentators	note	that	Macron	follows	in	the	footsteps	of	Tony	Blair	and	Bill	Clinton	who	attempted	to	sustain	economic	growth	by	compromising	the	status	of	working	class	individuals	while	favoring	pro-business	interests.13		The	direct	implication	is	that	slighting	laborers’	interests	while	promoting	those	of	wealthy	elites	serves	to	turn	members	of	the	working	classes	to	nationalist	and	populist	political	organizations	seemingly	better	suited	to	address	their	plights.		The	manifest	unpopularity	of	Macron’s	economic	reforms	is	evident	in	both	opinion	polls	and	the	Yellow	Vest	protests	disrupting	French	transportation	and	business	as	usual	throughout	the	latter	half	of	2018.		 Macron’s	policy	initiatives	were	aimed	to	place	France	on	a	more	secure	financial	footing	as	a	necessary	condition	to	maintaining	the	overall	solvency	of	the	European	Union	and	the	Eurozone.		Sharing	a	common	currency	places	members	of	the	Eurozone	in	the	position	of	being	mandated	to	each	have	a	limited	share	of	public	debt.		Thus,	to	keep	France’s	economic	house	in	order,	Macron	deemed	the	neoliberal	reforms	necessary.		He	has	gambled	on	surviving	the	unpopularity	of	these	policies,	and	that	by	the	end	of	his	first	term	economic	success	in	the	form	of																																																									13	George	Ross,	“The	French	Enigma:		Macron,	Centrist	Reformism,	and	the	Labor	Movement,	New	Labor	Forum,	2018,	pp.	1-7,	see	p.	5.	
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economic	growth,	higher	employment	rates,	and	higher	wages	will	prove	his	interventions	to	have	been	right.		His	policies	are	also	targeted	to	challenge	Germany	as	the	rightful	successor	to	the	United	Kingdom’s	key	role	in	European	banking	and	finance	as	the	UK	withdraws	from	the	EU.		 Thus	for	Macron,	as	for	Clinton,	Reagan,	and	Thatcher,	economic	reforms	are	economic	necessities.			For	Macron,	economic	reforms	are	necessary	prevent	the	financial	disintegration	of	the	Eurozone	and	financial	insolvency	of	individual	member	states.		Just	as	Thatcher	infamously	articulated	in	the	1980s,	“there	is	no	alternative”	to	neoliberal	economics.			Austerity,	low	corporate	taxation,	anti-trade	unionism,	self-responsibilization	and	the	flexibilization	of	work	are	deemed	necessary	for	a	nation	to	be	economically	competitive	in	post-industrial	economies.		Economic	realities	must	take	precedence	over	social	agendas.	Analysis		 Considering	the	fate	of	the	center	left	and	right	in	the	UK,	Germany,	and	France,	in	each	country	the	center	is	challenged	by	a	populist	surge.		However,	in	each	state,	unique	circumstances	shape	the	challenges.		In	the	UK,	the	far	left	and	far	right	extremes	meet	on	the	question	of	reasserting	British	sovereignty	over	political	and	economic	affairs.		In	Germany	the	established	left	and	right	parties	seek	to	absorb	the	potential	populist	voters	further	to	the	left	and	right.		In	France	Macron’s	effort	to	renew	France’s	political	economic	regime	to	make	it	more	competitive	itself	is	countered	by	rule	of	the	street.				 In	the	first	decades	of	the	twenty-first	century	it	is	surprising	that	one	of	the	greatest	challenges	to	the	stability	of	Europe	is	the	rise,	once	again	of	populist	
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nationalism.		This	rise	is	made	possible	by	the	loss	of	power	and	legitimacy	of	the	center	left	and	right	political	parties	across	Europe.		Voters	are	expressing	their	discontent	because	they	feel	that	their	voices	do	not	matter	to	government.		Government	leaders	and	bureaucrats	appear	to	be	elites	out	of	touch	with	the	common	person.		People	experience	that	their	standard	of	living	is	deteriorating	and	their	working	conditions	have	grown	uncertain.		Wages	have	essentially	stagnated	even	though	the	stock	market	continues	to	grow.		Wage	earners	must	compete	against	the	foreign	labor	supply	and	the	digitalization	of	work.		 The	original	argument	sustaining	the	European	Union	was	about	both	peace	and	economic	cooperation.		In	a	globalized	market	it	is	necessary	for	countries	to	form	common	alliances,	such	as	the	World	Trade	Organization	(1994)	and	Customs	Union	which	then	evolved	into	the	Eurozone	(1999)	with	its	own	currency	in	2002.		The	logic	of	the	European	Union	and	the	Eurozone	was	essentially,	“together	we	are	strong,	alone	we	are	weak.”		In	turn	to	maintain	both	the	EU	and	the	Single	European	Market	it	is	crucial	to	sustain	a	solvent	common	banking	system.		The	EU	and	the	SEM	rely	on	significant	political	and	economic	integration	in	order	maintain	their	viability.		Historically	as	integration	was	developed,	the	focus	tightened	on	markets	and	economic	integration.		Therefore	the	EU	itself	increasingly	came	to	function	as	a	regulatory	order	serving	economic	interests.		The	political	aspect	of	the	European	project	receded	as	concerns	about	economic	growth	and	solvency	gained	prominence.		The	establishment	of	the	European	Central	Bank	and	the	common	currency—and	the	acceptance	on	the	part	of	member	states	that	they	could	no	longer	devalue	their	currencies—meant	that	every	nation	had	to	have	its	own	
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economy	in	order	for	the	EU	to	be	stable.		This	in	turn	meant	that	when	nations	ran	significant	national	deficits,	they	came	under	a	lot	of	pressure	to	introduce	unpopular	austerity	measures.		Simultaneously	Europe	lacked	sufficient	means	to	foster	political	integration	to	counter	the	intense	focus	on	balanced-budgets.		While	the	northern	countries	were	more	successful	in	achieving	national	economic	growth,	the	southern	countries	struggled	to	pay	workers	enough	to	buy	products	from	international	markets.		As	we	now	know,	the	Greece	debt	crisis	almost	by	itself	posed	an	overwhelming	financial	threat	to	stability	of	the	entire	Euro	area.	Three	Questions		 Three	questions	invite	further	investigation.		First,	to	what	extent	did	the	shift	in	focus	from	political	community	to	economic	integration	(and	maintaining	the	regulatory	basis	for	a	single	European	Customs	Union)	pursue	economic	unity	at	the	price	of	political	integration	and	democratic	control?		Second,	let	us	accept	that	maintaining	the	economic	viability	of	the	Eurozone	has	depended	on	neoliberal	economic	reforms	of	changing	tax	structures	to	favor	socio-economic	elites	and	devaluating	wages,	which	in	turn	stokes	reactionary	populism	and	nationalism.			Is	there	a	path	forward	that	can	develop	sustainable	economic	policies	of	broad-based	inclusion	of	all	citizens?		Third,	let	us	recognize	the	thin	basis	for	the	European	Central	Bank.		The	ECB	does	not	have	sufficient	funds	and	liquidity	to	offer	or	guarantee	the	sizable	loans	required	to	offset	the	financial	needs	of	debtor	nations,	and	has	a	role	limited	to	the	currency-based	European	Stabilization	Mechanism.	Would	a	broader	approach	to	economic	stability	through	a	banking	system—(capable	of	maintaining	Keynesian	economic	demand-based	policy)	—offer	a	
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superior	tool	to	achieve	the	economic	inclusion	and	integration	necessary	to	prevent	descent	into	reactionary	nationalist	populism?		 These	three	looming	questions	address	three	themes:	(a)	the	political	
integration	of	citizens	of	EU	member	states	into	the	overarching	governance	of	the	European	Union;	(b)	the	economic	inclusion	of	these	citizens	to	offset	the	incessant	tendency	of	wealth	to	flow	upwards;	and	(c)	what	are	the	best	means	available	to	achieve	economic	solvency	and	growth.		These	three	questions	are	difficult	and	much	debated.		Moreover	consider	the	populist	reaction	to	the	as	yet	ongoing	trend	toward	increasing	employment	precarity,	which	has	followed	decades	of	neoliberal	economics	and	been	made	much	more	acute	after	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis.		It	is	unclear	how	much	time	remains	to	defuse	the	alienation	fueling	populist	nationalism.		This	time	constraint	is	already	obvious	in	Donald	Trump’s	presidency	and	his	ongoing	campaign	to	“Make	America	Great	Again.”		Time	pressures	are	also	evident	as	Britain	stands	on	the	brink	of	exiting	the	European	project,	Annegret	Kramp-Karrenbauer’s	Christian	Democrat	Union	party	vies	to	maintain	its	political	viability	to	lead	Germany,	and	French	citizens	protest	Emmanuel	Macron’s	reforms.		The	EU’s	political	organization	transcends	the	national	sovereignty	of	Britain,	France	and	Germany.		Hence	the	withdrawal	of	support	for	the	European	Union	from	any	of	these	key	member	states	and	their	citizens,	counters	the	late	twentieth-century	liberal	world	order.		This	legal	and	institutional	order	was	built,	and	successively	rebuilt,	brick	by	brick,	and	document	by	document,	out	of	five	millennium	of	human	experimentation	with	governance.		This	order	very	recently	
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survived	a	calamitous	second	World	War	in	which	Europe	was	spared	atomic	destruction	that	was	instead	turned	toward	the	far	East.	Neoliberalism		 Recall	three	above	urgent	questions	(1)	of	the	importance	of	political	versus	mere	economic	integration,	(2)	the	purported	necessity	of	neoliberal	economic	reforms,	(3)	and	the	surest	means	to	achieving	inclusive	wealth	generation	in	the	European	Union.		Even	though	we	do	not	know	the	answer	to	these	questions,	we	can	be	certain	that	neoliberal	reforms	fuel	the	political	movements	that	currently	oppose	supranational	European	sovereignty.		Neoliberal	reforms	also	support	government	by	technocratic	elites,	which	also	inspire	populist	protests.		However,	even	without	directly	answering	the	three	questions,	we	can	observe	that	they	are	tightly	related.		First,	political	integration	was	significantly	reduced	by	the	policy	emphasis	and	tools	used	to	construct	the	Eurozone.		The	achievement	of	economic	integration	has	placed	achieving	efficiency	as	a	crucial	aim.		This	emphasis	downplays	many	human	concerns.		These	include	citizens’	participation	in	decision-making	authority,	and	in	choosing	which	values	and	procedures	should	be	supported.		Economic	efficiency	threatens	community,	solidarity,	and	commitment	as	it	supports	unlimited	economic	competition.		Second,	neoliberal	economic	policies	depend	on	specific	policy	tools	which	span	both	the	center	left	and	right.		These	have	been	implemented	using	New	Public	Management	and	public	choice	schools	of	training.		From	within	the	neoliberal	paradigm,	every	decision	is	an	economic	choice,	and	efficiency	is	the	only	neutral	and	objective	method	of	directing	
Amadae,	Aaltonen	 14	
public	policy.14		However,	the	very	tools	used	to	implement	neoliberal	economic	policy	presuppose	answers	to	the	three	overarching	questions	posed	throughout	this	essay.		These	tools	view	all	decision-making	as	economic.		They	treat	political	integration	as	a	form	of	individualistic	competition	promoted	by	economists.		They	also	view	neoliberal	economic	reforms	as	necessary	for	economic	solvency	and	prosperity.				 Furthermore,	and	third,	from	within	the	schools	of	neoliberal	economics,	Keynesian	methods	are	regarded	as	illegitimate.		These	methods	stimulate	economic	demand	through	public	spending	as	a	means	to	reach	higher	employment	goals	and	achieve	economic	growth.		Public	choice	economics	disdain	Keynes.		They	see	no	role	for	governance	in	public	finance,	and	even	suggest	that	potentially	the	monetary	regulation	of	interest	rates	is	best	determined	by	the	market.		Public	choice	economics	distrusts	public	governance	and	argues	that	privatized	control	of	resources	and	the	exercise	of	private	authority	best	respects	individual	rights.		However,	as	is	evident	in	Macron’s	approach,	neoliberal	reforms	risk	alienating	democratic	stakeholders	and	those	whose	livelihood	is	secured	one	pay	check	at	a	time.		Despite	the	constructive	role	labor	unions	played	in	neutralizing	the	destructive	consequences	of	the	competition	unemployed	individuals	for	insufficient	jobs	with	subsistence	level	(or	less	pay),	neoliberal	ideology	and	practice	opposes	labor	organization.		The	Keynesian	economic	approach	is	deemed	a	non-starter	because	neoliberalism	champions	market	solutions	and	a	limited	role	for	governance	and	public	funds.																																																											14	For	discussion	see	S.M.	Amadae,	Prisoners	of	Reason:		Game	Theory	and	Neoliberal	
Political	Economy,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2016.	
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	 Neoliberal	economics	poses	categorical	answers	to	the	three	overarching	questions	of	our	current	political	economic	moment.		Politics	is	just	economic	competition	by	another	name;	economic	integration	displaces	the	need	for	political	integration.		Neoliberal	economic	reform	is	necessary	to	achieve	economic	stability	and	growth.		The	only	role	a	central	bank	can	legitimately	play	in	public	finance	is	the	monetary	role	of	stipulating	interest	rates,	and	possibly	offering	loans	and	guaranteeing	creditors’	deposits.		Yet	in	the	2008-2009	global	financial	crisis	it	was	demonstrably	shown	that	neoliberal	economics	does	not	generate	inclusive	prosperity,	and	that	it	tends	to	privatize	profit	and	socialize	debt.		Most	crucially,	contrary	to	what	neoliberal	economic	models	showed,	the	market	is	not	guaranteed	to	accurately	price	risk.		Therefore,	the	market	does	not	provide	any	guarantee	that	economic	collapse	will	not	result	from	individuals’	rational	choices.		Thus	governmental	oversight	in	the	form	of	regulations	of	financial	products	and	policies	to	balance	the	tendency	of	wealthy	to	trickle	up	is	necessary.	Conclusion:		Finland’s	Challenges		 Finland	now	faces	some	similar	challenges	regarding	maintain	economic	competitiveness	that	worried	Macron,	and	cannot	avoid	the	difficult	questions	posed	above.		Finland	has	maintained	a	strong	social	welfare	state,	especially	when	contrasted	with	the	US,	Germany,	and	the	United	Kingdom	which	have	already	undergone	neoliberal	reforms.		In	Finland,	respect	for	labor	unions	and	protection	of	workers’	dignity	and	economic	status	is	vibrant,	and	the	state	provides	generous	public	services.		Nevertheless,	economists	warn	of	an	increasingly	lack	of	competitiveness	and	need	to	encourage	more	flexible	employment	as	a	means	to	
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maintain	its	comprehensive	pension	program,	to	lower	unemployment,	and	to	remain	economically	competitive	in	a	global	market	of	goods	and	services.				 So	far	in	public	political	debate	it	is	straightforward	to	propose	that	market-based	reforms	and	fiscal	restraint	will	help	resolve	Finland's	long	term	economic	challenges.		Yet	this	apparent	commonsense	mistakenly	lumps	together	the	embrace	of	neoliberal	economic	reforms,	which	are	linked	to	populist	nationalism,	with	a	strong	respect	for	public	interest	consistent	with	Adam	Smith's	blueprint	for	liberty.		Political	integration	and	economic	inclusion	traditionally	characterize	the	political	center	in	Finland.		Smith's	system	of	natural	liberty	is	consistent	with	the	center	of	Finnish	politics.		Neoliberal	reforms	would	bring	the	Finnish	political	economic	system	into	uncharted	territory	were	they	to	emphasize	privatization,	austerity,	and	eroded	respect	for	labor.			Neoliberal	economics	is	usually	introduced	because,	allegedly,	"there	is	no	alternative."		By	contrast,	Smtih's	market-based	rule	of	law	is	aspirational	and	emancipatory.	 	
